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Introduction
We do not employ the language of evil as freely as our forebears did.
But call Hitler or the Holocaust evil and you are unlikely to arouse much disagreement. On the contrary: you will have better luck generating dissent if you refer to Hitler or the Holocaust merely as bad or wrong:
"Hitler was a bad person, and what he did was wrong." As is often noted, such tepid language seems terribly inadequate to the moral gravity of this subject matter. Prefix your adjectives with as many "verys" as you like;
you still fall short. Only 'evil', it seems, will do. It makes a difference whether we call someone evil, or merely (very, very . . . ) bad. The question is, what difference does it make? Does the concept of evil designate a significant moral category? Or is it merely a vehicle for shoddy thinking, serving no other purpose than to demonize whomever we find most distasteful? Philosophical theorizing about evil persons and actions has picked up in recent years, but for the most part theories (including my own) have been defended on grounds of intuitive plausibility, with little attention given to the motivation for distinguishing the evil from the merely bad. This leaves unanswered the question of why we ought to prefer one account to another: does one theory capture something of moral significance that the other does not? We wish to broaden our un derstanding of moral phenomena, not simply to describe folk concepts of dubious import.
In this paper I shall focus on the theory of evil character, arguing that most theories fail to support a robust bad/evil distinction. One intuitively confuse the evil person with the moral criminal, who is properly contrast ed with the hero and not the saint. The concept of an evil person is, I
conclude, morally significant, if perhaps less useful in practice than we might have hoped.
Two problems
A natural starting point is this: to be evil is to be the worst possible kind of person. Take your favored moral theory, consider its account of character, and then look to the negative end of the spectrum. This tactic might seem to provide all the motivation we need. Moreover, this approach respects the appearance that evil is an all-or-nothing affair: we tend not to speak of one person's being "more" or "less" evil than another.
We seem to add nothing by saying that someone is "very" evil.2
If correct, this approach would essentially obviate the theory of evil:
it is just a special case of standard moral theory, an uninteresting extension of what we already believe.3 But this strategy cannot work. One worry about the proposal is that it appears to treat the concept of evil simply as a theoretical notion in ethics. Yet the concept has its home, not in moral theory, but in ordinary moral discourse. 'Evil' has an independent, if less than clear, meaning. Theorists of evil ought not to treat the term as if it were up for grabs, to be defined however it suits our moral theories. If we wish to take the moral phenomena seriously, we need to take the ordinary notion seriously. Otherwise we risk giving a theory of something that has little to do with evil as we know it. We may in the end decide to revise or even abandon the ordinary concept, but we can only make that decision
once we know what we are talking about. It is possible that the notion of evil does in fact conform to this approach: it denotes whatever proves to be the worst possible character. But this would have to be shown by seeing how well the account conforms to the folk notion, not by simply annexing the notion into one's favorite moral theory.
A far more serious difficulty is this: the proposal essentially defines evil out of existence, shrinking the range of possibilities to a mere point.
On this sort of view the evil person would have, at every moment, to be doing the worst possible things, with the worst possible feelings and motives.4 This would make the theory and the concept of evil uninterest ing: not even Satan, it seems, would qualify. (Wouldn't Satan want a little time for himself?) A theory that requires a satanically depraved character to qualify as evil seems too demanding. A theory that insists on an extra satanic dedication to malevolence is just silly.
We can improve the approach by toning it down: an evil person is indeed the worst kind of person, but this kind of person comes in degrees.
One need not at every moment do, feel, and desire the worst possible things; it suffices for being evil that one come close enough to this. And the "close enough" mark may be far enough from the logical extreme that the notion of evil actually has application, not just to the satanically fiendish, but to mere mortals. Now we understand evil as a more or less broad category that marks off the worst region on the scale of good and bad character, not just the worst point. To my knowledge, this is how theorists have actually approached the matter. But two further difficulties emerge.
Where on the scale does the merely bad give way to the evil? How close to the extreme of utmost depravity is close enough? You might think it doesn't much matter: wherever we feel inclined to draw the line. And this is likely to be rather vague, with a number of cases being neither clearly evil nor clearly not. This appears to be a common sentiment amongst commentators on the subject. Thus Laurence Thomas dubs people evil if they are "often enough" prone to commit evil acts (1993, p. 82) ; and John Kekes calls evil those who are "regular" sources of undeserved harm (1990, pp. 47-8; 1998, p. 217 ).
Yet it does matter where we draw the line: for the distinction between bad and evil is not merely one of degree. It is a qualitative difference.5 As I noted above, we cannot get from bad to evil by adding any number of "verys." Calling individuals evil places them in a different moral realm from the merely bad. These do not appear to be arbitrary linguistic artifacts. Moreover, to say that the dividing line doesn't matter is just to say that the distinction between evil and bad doesn't matter. Which is to say that the theory of evil, as such, doesn't matter. We could just as well call it the theory of the (very) bad.6 A theory of evil ought to accommo date the idea that there is a significant moral boundary between the evil and the merely bad?or, if not, explain the appearance that there is such a boundary. We will see that the bad/evil distinction poses difficulties for a number of accounts.
A second concern is that allowing for better and worse within the category of evil appears to violate the sense that evil doesn't come in degrees. Perhaps this is just the price to be paid for ensuring that the notion can apply to an interesting range of cases. Moreover, the intuitions favoring the view that evil is an all-or-nothing affair are not overwhelm ingly strong; some may not share them at all. The worry is not extreme.
But it would be a plus if we could explain why it seems odd (to some of us, at least) to call a person or action "very" or "somewhat" evil.
We don't just want a theory of evil that is substantively motivated and takes the greatest joy in witnessing others in agony. The handicap makes her less dangerous, but it scarcely makes her a better person. Nor does it make her anything better than evil.12 Even if harm-doing were necessary for evil, it is hard to believe that a person's motives could fail to be relevant to the determination of whether one is evil. Those who in tentionally harm others out of sheer malice aie surely worse, and better candidates for evil, than those who do harm only as a means to achieving their ends.
The second problem with harm-based theories is their apparent inability to support a robust bad/evil distinction. How frequent and gross a harm doer does one have to be to qualify as, not merely bad, but evil? To insist that evil people inflict undeserved harm whenever possible is absurdly demanding, and the view that evil persons usually do so is little better.
Focusing on the magnitude of harm also seems inadequate: there appears to be no point at which, by committing still greater harms, we cross a moral Rubicon of the sort that might distinguish the evil from the bad.
Besides, someone who is generally benevolent but would destroy the world whenever given the chance is not credibly regarded as evil, even if she is sane. Perhaps the evil person is one who never acts altruistically. The worry is not that the distinction is vague, but rather that it lacks the kind of significance that the bad/evil distinction appears to have. (This does not mean a failure to understand the relevant moral considerations, but rather a failure to be properly moved by them.) Thomas's view is also partly harm-based, and thus looks both inward and outward. This strikes an appealing balance between our concern for the damage evil people do and our interest in the motives of the evil person. A second approach is to look, not for extremity of motive, but con sistency of motive: the evil person consistently?usually or always?governs her behavior by motives that are not morally good.17 (An insistence on having consistently bad motives would, again, be too demanding. Most behavior, even in moral monsters, is perfectly innocent.) I am unaware of any theorists who have explicitly taken this route, but S. I. Benn comes close (1985) . Employing the language of wickedness, he suggests that "a person may be wicked because the maxims that order his life are, by and large, evil maxims, that is, maxims that no one ought to act on at all" (p.
796). If we read 'evil maxims' in an intuitive manner, this claim is too strong.
"I shall steal a pack of gum whenever I wish to" may be an immoral maxim, but we would not regard it as evil. Benn apparently means nothing stronger than "immoral." The evil person, then, is governed "by and large" by im morality. Even this is too demanding, but it is doubtful that Benn thinks it a necessary condition for being evil (thus he says "a person may be wicked . . . "). Amongst the wicked he (with Kant) counts the merely selfish: those who do not actively seek immorality or the bad, but whose self-concern forecloses the consideration of "any good but one's own good" (p. 798). Such persons need not be governed "by and large" by bad does not seem to be any plausible degree of frequency or regularity of evil-doing that could provide a natural demarcation between the evil and the merely bad person?not even a vaguely specified one. The regular or frequent evil-doer seems different only in degree from the not-quite regular or frequent evil-doer. The transition from one to the other does not seem particularly significant.
We should also wonder about the motivation for a motive-based account. If evil concerns us not simply for its effects, but also (or instead) for what it says about an agent's psychology, then why stop at the agent's motives? Why not also incorporate the agent's affective dispositions?
Surely it makes a difference to one's character whether one takes pleasure in the suffering of others. Recall the voyeuristic misanthrope; this person is evil, not simply for his motives, for having an evil will, but because he enjoys seeing people in agony. Indeed, it seems that this more than anything is what drives us to call him evil. A decent person does not rejoice at the spectacle of a child on the rack. We rightly think less of such an individual (to put it mildly). How we feel about the predicaments of our fellow creatures makes a difference in our characters, quite apart from how we are motivated to treat them. So why ignore such feelings in our account of the evil character, unless?with the harm-based theorist?we ultimately care only about the harm evil people do? If you include motives, you should include affect.
Someone might object that affect is more or less independent of volition?how we feel about things is substantially beyond our control?
and thus we ought not to be morally assessed for it. But supposing that we
should not be blamed for having certain feelings, it does not follow that we are no less morally estimable for having them. Our disgust with those who enjoy their confederates' travails does not depend on any assumption that those feelings are voluntary. I shall not argue the point at length, however, since I have addressed it elsewhere (1999). I have challenged the grounds for including motives but not affect in our account of evil character. But we ought to include affect in our theory, however the account is motivated. Motive-based accounts are incomplete.
In fact, while I used Thomas's view to illustrate the motive-based approach, his account appears to incorporate affect as such:20 to "delight" in per forming an immoral and harmful act, and to exhibit "deadened moral sensibilities," is not merely to have certain motives. It is to have, and lack, certain feelings. Though ultimately unsatisfactory, his view points us in the right direction.
Affect-based accounts
Someone sufficiently impressed by the significance of affect for having an evil character might suppose that that is all there is to being evil: being disposed to take pleasure in the suffering of others, and perhaps also to suffer at the pleasure of others. Colin McGinn recently developed such an account (1997) . While this sort of view is remarkably plausible considering how far it diverges from the traditional focus on action in moral theory, it too is incomplete: matters of motivation count as well. Governing one's life by evil or immoral maxims, or letting hate be one's guide, is clearly relevant to having an evil character. While we may dispute Kant's assessment of the unsympathetic but dutiful man, we would be hard-pressed to regard a truly dutiful person as evil, however deranged her sympathies. A further worry is whether an affect-based theory can supply a firm bad/evil distinction. Once gain we would be asking too much to insist that evil persons must usually or always take pleasure in others' suffering. Yet allowing a mere lack of sympathy or otherwise appropriate affect to suffice for being evil is too permissive.
And placing the cutoff at "frequently" or "regularly" experiencing un wholesome affect amounts to abandoning the idea that there is a qualitative difference between bad and evil.
An affective-motivational account
Harm-based views underestimate the importance of psychology for the theory of evil character, whereas motive-and affect-based theories take too narrow a view of the relevant psychology. Each type of theory risks failing to underwrite a robust bad/evil distinction. In two earlier papers I have outlined a pluralistic account that incorporates both affective and motivational components (Haybron 1999; . Here I shall briefly summarize the theory and then argue that it does, like (one version of) Benn's account, permit a robust bad/evil distinction. In the remainder of the paper I will argue that this view is well-motivated. We can think of being virtuous or vicious in terms of having a certain orientation to the good (where the good is understood in a broad manner that can include the right).21 Insofar as one's disposition is to be appropriately moved22 and motivated by the good, we may say that one is aligned with the good. (I say "aligned with" because we need an expression that can encompass both conation and affect, and other terms like 'loves'23 have undesirable connotations.) One is virtuous insofar as one is at least adequately aligned with the good (some vices consist merely in being too-weakly aligned with the good). To be evil is, on my view, to be consistently vicious in the following sense: one is not aligned with the good to a morally significant extent.74 Evil persons are either wholly unaligned with the good, or they are moved and motivated by it so little that it makes no significant differ ence to the moral quality of their characters: morally speaking, they are not significantly better people than the wholly unaligned. They have no good side, but are consistently vicious. They do not show real compassion or conscience, among other things.25 Taking a cue from Thomas, we could say that they possess profoundly deadened or perverse moral sensibilities.
Yet, contra Thomas, they need never perform evil acts or do any harm at all (though that is most unlikely). Evil persons could even tend to conform their actions to duty, so long as this is not properly grounded in genuine respect or concern for others: perhaps they are merely being prudent, me chanically parroting rules they were taught, or pursuing aspirations of nobility. (A Hitler, for instance, might fulfill some of his duties purely out of the belief that not doing so would show him to be weak or ignoble.)
Alignment or otherwise with the good is an internal, psychological matter:
someone perfectly aligned with the good may inadvertently cause a disaster. This is not an Augustinian view, since evil need not be a mere privation; evil persons may, like Satan, be strenuously opposed to the good. My discussion will focus on less extreme cases, since those are the most controversial.
This view may seem to be both too demanding and too permissive. This account also explains the sense that evil doesn't come in degrees:
one either is, or is not, significantly aligned with the good. One either is or isn't evil. Yet we need not sharply limit the range of evil characters:
within the category of evil there is still morally better and worse.
Motivating the account

A broader characterology
The most serious objection to this account concerns its motivation:
why should we conceive of evil this way, however intuitively plausible the account may be, and however well it explains the bad/evil distinction? it has no bearing on how people's characters actually are.
Notice that frequent evil-doing accounts are attractive also because they fulfill a seemingly important desideratum: they make it easy for us to say that the usual exemplars of depravity, the "successful" Hitlers and Bundys of the world, are evil. It is plausible that those who would stress this putative requirement would not be similarly concerned to account for the world's frustrated?but no better constituted?Hitlers and Bundys.
Kekes, for instance, explicitly requires an evil person to have established a pattern of evildoing (1990, pp. 48-49) . This, I would suggest, is because frequent evil-doing accounts do not characterize what it is to have the worst sort of character. Their subject matter is, rather, the moral criminal, or an extreme variety thereof. To be a moral criminal is, roughly, to have performed seriously immoral acts29 that reflect major deficiencies of character. The qualifier 'moral' is meant to stress that this is not a legal but a moral kind (through I will sometimes omit the qualifier). We often refer to individuals as criminals merely by virtue of their having done something bad, but there is more to it than that. For we would hesitate to denounce someone as a criminal if we believed his crimes to be com pletely out of character, aberrant bits of behavior that fail to reflect any well-embedded disposition. We might wish to add that criminals must be, on the whole, vicious, or at least not virtuous: they are not good people.
Criminality is partly a matter of character and partly a matter of history.
Those whom Kekes and Thomas?and lay ascriptive practice?would deem evil are better described as an extreme variety of criminal. And because criminality is linked mainly to the performance of certain sorts of actions, the notion can only encompass part of a person's character. Much of moral significance is necessarily left out. The notion of criminality is too blame-oriented and too narrow for the purpose of specifying the worst sort of character. For that, we need to set aside questions of history and consider every morally important aspect of an individual's character, not just those that pertain to certain sorts of action. We need a distinct, purely aretaic, notion. Some proponents of frequent evil-doing accounts might object that their concern is with estimability and not with blameworthiness: what makes the frequent evil-doer evil is not the actual performance of evil but rather the propensity to attempt it.30 And it is worse to be disposed to perform frequent acts of evil than to be, say, a quietly amoral bureaucrat. To some extent this is correct: the frequent evil-doer does have some important vices that are worse than the corresponding vices of the quiet amoralist. Yet some evil-doers have important virtues that the amoralist lacks: they have a good side, often exhibiting genuine compassion, con scientiousness, and other moral virtues. And the depth of an amoralist's depravity may become apparent only in unusual circumstances, as when gross immorality is clearly prudent, or when faced with opportunities for profound callousness. That the evil-doer is worse in some very important respects does not oblige us to call him a worse person. (We may, given that he actually does do evil, consider him worse on the whole in one way:
he is more blameworthy, more deserving of censure and punishment. And consider whether he would really seem worse than the quiet amoralist if he somehow did not manage to perform evil acts. The evil person is not our only exemplar of immorality ; the criminal is another.)
The distinction between evil and criminality mirrors a distinction we find at the other end of the moral spectrum: that between moral saints and moral heroes.31 Like being a criminal, being a hero is partly a matter of character and partly a matter of history: the hero has performed some great deed or deeds, and has done so not by accident or by acting out of character, but by acting from a virtuous disposition. The hero need not be perfectly virtuous, and may in fact be deeply flawed; indeed, some of the most interesting heroes are seriously flawed. We would not, however, regard as a hero someone whose character was generally poor. The hero is a good, or at least decent, person who has done great things.
The saint, by contrast, is the image of moral perfection: this person has no significant moral flaws or vices, but is perfectly virtuous, or nearly so. He is pure, the positive counterpart of the evil person.32 As with the evil person, the saint's status depends partly on her motivational economy and partly on her affective dispositions: perhaps Kant's unsympathetic but dutiful man qualifies as a good person, but he is no saint. In fact it is the we could say that the saint is "not significantly unaligned" with the good.
But this is awkward.)
Someone might object that saints differ in an important way from evil people as I have characterized them: whereas evil does not require the performance of seriously immoral actions, sainthood does require the doing of many good deeds. Sainthood consists substantially in performing the right kinds of actions, even if evil does not. We would not, for instance, call a completely inactive person a saint. Let's assume that the worry does not simply reflect an epistemic limitation: in practice we would have to basis for evaluating the character of someone who displayed no observ able behavior. I think we can explain any apparent difference in terms of general differences between virtues and vices. For example, virtues are more closely linked to action than vices. A truly kind person will act kindly when the occasion arises; whereas it is easier for a callous person not to act callously: perhaps she fears retribution. In general, vices may be prevented from issuing in action by various factors that do not impact the saint, including other vices. Someone's failure to act viciously when the occasion permits it need not reflect a less vicious character; whereas someone's failure to act virtuously does reflect a less virtuous character.
While claims about the unity of the virtues are overstated, they do reflect an important truth: virtues are less separable than vices. In general, virtue is more demanding than vice.
In fact it is not so clear that sainthood requires good woks: suppose a proven saint were badly crippled in an accident, so that she could no longer do good deeds. This would not entail a moral decline in her character, but would merely hinder the expression of her virtues. Indeed, we can readily imagine someone's character improving through such a turn of events. fundamental of life as friendship would be impossible without genuine concern, quite apart from how such concern issues in action.) Why might
we care specifically about whether someone is evil as I understand it, versus merely bad or an evil-doer?
One reason is that the evil character provides us with a moral anchor, an anti-ideal. Even if no real person qualified as evil, the notion would still be useful for illuminating our moral ideals and defining the moral space within which we situate less fiendish individuals. It is useful to see which traits are most abhorrent, and which individuals best approximate the moral nadir of the evil person. Knowing what it is to be evil tells us who we most want not to be.
A second reason is that the ascription of evil affords various simpli fications. The evil person, in the consistency of her vice, presents us with none of the difficulties posed by more complicated, merely bad individu als?mere criminals. She has no good side. We need not worry that we shall lose our resolve to deal appropriately with her if we learn too much about her. And we can confidently predict how she will behave: never from decent motives. When she does do evil, we need seek no special ex planation: lacking the moral qualms that inconvenience the rest of us, then of course she will do awful things.
Moreover, the evil person is beyond ordinary moral criticism and dialogue: he has no better nature to which we can appeal. Morality has no significant foothold in him. He is arguably beyond redemption through rational deliberation; nothing short of a conversion or reprogramming, it seems, could rehabilitate him.36 He understands morality, and may be perfectly capable of moral decency, but he rarely if ever exercises this capacity. Because of this, the evil person is also beyond society: a moral exile. No one can expect good from her, or engage in genuine friendship with or expect love from her. She may exhibit at best a kind of reptilian affection for others, devoid of genuine empathy, human concern, or respect. One reason why criminals and their families so often go out of their way to argue that they aren't evil, that they are really just like everyone else, is precisely to avoid this implication of the label. How could even a mother love an evil person? And how could one regard as love the affection shown by a father or husband who merits the term 'evil'? Seriously to regard someone as evil is to claim him ineligible for any human relationship. This is no small condemnation. (Consider the Jewish victims of the Holocaust, whose extermination was facilitated by the view that they were evil [Thomas 1993] .) The evil person is something of an alien, lying somewhere between the human and demonic. We call her, not coincidentally, a monster. The appellation 'evil' thus serves to distance its subjects from the rest of us, to emphasize the profound moral and psychological gulf between them and us. Interestingly, calling someone a saint has a similar effect: the saint occupies a point in moral space between the ordinary person and the angelic, and is almost superhuman in his moral purity. Unlike most heroes, the saint need not struggle to overcome temptation: uninfected by the impurities of a normal person, he is largely beyond temptation, for acting well comes naturally. We should not be surprised, then, that few people would really want to be regarded as a saint. The saint seems suffi ciently alien to be a less than ideal friend or relative (save perhaps as a parent). For one thing, she lacks the usual human weaknesses and thus, we may suppose, the ability fully to understand or empathize with the diffi culties her compatriots must face. For another, her very perfection creates a deep moral asymmetry between herself and her friends and relatives: she is manifestly a better person?indeed, perfect. Who wants a friend like that? Relationships require a certain degree of equality. They flourish through the matching of strengths and weaknesses, and through the com plementarity of vice as well as through the virtues. Otherwise we shall have too much, or too little, to offer each other. Like the notion of an evil person, the notion of a saint serves to distance its object from the rest of us. One is clearly better than the other, but no sensible person really wishes to be either.37
The fact that the notion of evil underwrites these kinds of simplifica tion may seem to count against its utility: people are rarely so simple, and it is even more rarely that we can know enough about someone justifiably to regard them as evil. The term is thus liable to be abused more often than not. And its legitimate uses will prove highly restricted. This seems right, but it does not count against my view: the notion is still useful insofar as it designates a real moral extreme. Evil persons are probably neither common nor easily identified, but they do comprise a genuine and inter esting class of moral characters. The utility of a notion is not simply a function of how often we may be warranted in applying it.
The present worry also indicates that the theory of evil matters. We often make judgments about those whom we take to be highly vicious, and sometimes we refer to them as evil. This is an extreme form of con demnation, and we had best get it right. (1999) . This now strikes me as unnatural; as I note later, it is preferable to speak of morally better and worse than more or less evil.
3. One related approach would not have this result: start with an account of evil as the worst possible, then build a complete moral theory from that. While the theory of evil may well shed light on general moral theory, this tactic surely goes too far.
4. Or some subset of these, depending on one's theory of character. The evil person, thus understood, appears to be the negative counterpart of Susan Wolf's saint, "whose every action is as morally good as possible ... who is as morally worthy as can be" (Wolf 1982, p. 413) . As a serious account of sainthood, this view suffers the same deficiencies as the present view of evil character. However, Wolf's purposes in that paper do not require a full-blooded account of the conditions for sainthood, so this is not really a problem for her.
5. As Garrard notes (1998, p. 44) . Her paper also addresses the significance of the bad/evil distinction.
6. As such it would still be interesting: extremes of moral depravity are worth studying whether or not we employ the concept of evil.
7. (Kekes 1990; . 8. I use this term to denote the bad things, like pains, that we commonly refer to as evils. Though I refer to them as "non-moral," they may (but need not) be implicated in im morality. We might call them natural evils, but this term is commonly used to denote only evils not caused by human agency.
9. Consequentialists unhappy with Kekes's reliance on desert needn't worry: that aspect of his account is not relevant to the discussion that follows.
10. As Frederic Schick put it to me. 11. There is actually a family of evil concepts, but for convenience I often refer to "the" concept of evil. 12. This example is essentially the same as one given by S. I. Benn (1985) . 13. I originally described this case in Haybron (1999) . The point that follows is new. This case differs from Benn's handicapped person in that the voyeur lacks the motivation to harm others, whereas in the other case only the means are lacking.
14. Cf., e.g., Adams (1976 (Hurka 1992; 2001) . Hurka defends his conception of virtue by taking virtuous attitudes to be among the intrinsic goods. Still, one might wonder whether his consequentialism really allows him to divorce the virtues from their consequences in this way. He can call the voyeur evil, but as a consequentialist can he truly regard relatively harmless monsters like this as morally worse than the average thief, who may do much more harm? (That is, without placing an implausibly high intrinsic disvalue on vicious attitudes.) 16. Todd Calder advocates a variant of Thomas's theory (forthcoming). Eve Garrard defends a roughly similar account of evil action (1998). Instead of requiring delight, her view takes the evil action to consist primarily in the "silencing" (see McDowell [1978] ) of the reasons against committing a wrongful act. As Garrard notes, we can readily imagine extending this account to cover evil character.
17. And meets the conditions for moral agency. 18. Garrard's account of evil acts naturally suggests a view like the one under consid eration: the evil agent is one for whom the reasons against wrongdoing are consistently silenced. This theory might also seem insufficiently demanding. More worrisome, I think, is that it seems not to allow for more virulent strains of wickedness: those for whom the undeserved suffering of others is not silenced, but is rather a source of attraction. This is a general problem for perceptual theories of moral motivation: it is implausible that evil is never more than a kind of moral blindness.
19. For a depressingly vivid account of this history, see Glover (1999) . 20. Recall that it also departs from a purely motive-based approach by incorporating harm.
21. One's orientation toward the bad also counts, but I will set aside this qualification in what follows. This account is influenced by Hurka's theory of virtue and vice (1992; 2001) . Ronald Milo also takes evil to consist in an affective-motivational defect of character (1984; 1998) .
22.
I.e., having the appropriate affective responses. Being "appropriately" moved and motivated by the good consists in being moved and motivated positively by the good (and not, say, repelled by it); being moved to the right degree (and not moved, say, to the point that one is overly squeamish about inflicting necessary pain); and being moved by the good for the right reasons (not, e.g., out of some robotic impulse). 23. Cf. Hurka (1992; 2001) . 24. I will usually shorten this to "one is not significantly aligned with the good." We shall eventually need some explication of just what it means to be aligned with the good, not just simpliciter, but in a morally significant way. For instance, an evil person may be concerned about her own good or exhibit such executive virtues as resourcefulness and courage (if we may call it that), and a lover of art might count as evil. But we need not resolve such worries here. At any rate, the qualifier 'morally* is probably less important than it seems: there appears to be a perfectly natural sense in which an evil person, however prudent or aesthetically enlightened, may be completely opposed to the good. Satan, for example, is often said to have many virtues. (As Loren Lomasky pointed out to me.) But these are not morally redeeming; nor do they give cause for regarding him as in any important way a friend of the good.
25. They need not lack the capacity for these, however. Perhaps, e.g., they are wholly devoted to some monstrous ideology. I argue that evil persons qualify as moral agents in (1999; forthcoming). 26. We should distinguish genuinely human love, caring, and respect from mere affection. Even an evil person can have great affection for others, but this may be no more morally significant than someone's affection for his favorite possessions.
27. Consider the phenomenon of "industrial psychopaths"?individuals who success fully pursue professional careers despite meeting the criteria for psychopathy (Sherman 2000) . Whether psychopaths qualify as moral agents or not, such individuals illustrate just how little it takes, morally speaking, to pose as a respectable member of society. 28. For a helpful discussion of the distinction between blame and estimability in relation to the emotions, see Oakley (1992) .
29. We might wish to add: against others, or involving serious harm to others. Such niceties are not important here.
30. But recall that Kekes, at least, denies this. 31. Cf., among others, Blum (1988) , Urmson (1958), and Wolf (1982) . My view differs substantially from Urmson's, though this may result largely from a difference in our purposes. The notion of a saint that concerns us is purely a moral, and not religious, notion. Notice also that saints are specifically moral exemplars; as Wolf argues, they need not be the best people all things considered.
32. Melville referred to Billy Budds Claggart as "the direct reverse of a saint" (1924) . 33. Two points. First, the notions of God, Satan, and other supernatural beings function here as logical placeholders; the present discussion makes no assumptions about the existence of such figures. Second, one might wonder how it is possible for the saint's perfect alignment with the good to be exceeded. This is an interesting question, but it should suffice for present purposes to say that the saint's perfection is relative to the type of being she is: she is aligned with the good as strongly as is humanly possible. 34. Psychologist Jonathan Haidt contends that human beings naturally conceptualize the social domain in terms of a moral space, one of whose dimensions is arguably this one (forthcoming). Seeing vice, he argues, triggers a moral emotion of disgust, whereas virtue elicits the opposite of disgust, an emotion he calls "elevation." He does not distinguish the monster-saint dimension from the criminal-hero dimension, but it is plausible that his claims refer to the former.
35. Blum stresses this point in his discussion of Oskar Schindler (1988) . 36. Cf. Harman (1977) . 37. Wolf quotes the following passage from a piece on Gandhi by George Orwell:
"sainthood is ... a thing that human beings must avoid.... it is probable that some who aspire to achieve sainthood have never felt much temptation to be human beings" (Orwell 1945, p. 176) ; cited in Wolf (1982) . 38. To call them "moral write-offs" is not to say they are irredeemably evil. Something might prompt a conversion for the better. But attempts to reason with them morally seem futile.
39. Psychologist Robert Hare reports that psychopaths comprise "perhaps 1%" of the general population (1998), using criteria that are similar to those for an evil person (however, the measures do not assess whether these individuals count as moral agents;
perhaps many of them do not). As I noted earlier, some psychopaths lead seemingly re spectable lives as professionals; perhaps the reader works with one.
40. This connects with questions of moral luck. See, e.g., Nagel (1979) , and Williams (1981) .
